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1. Introduction  
Sönmez (1990: 12) starts his book with the following words on the one hand: “It does not matter 
whether we are aware of it or not. Approximately 50 families or capital groups have managed Turkey. 
And the domination of these families has consolidated with every passing year. From economy to 
politics, from cultural life to the foreign policy, the decisions determining the destiny of 60 million 
have been decided by these big families or holding companies”. On the other hand, Buğra (1994: 187) 
emphasizes that “the decision to enter into a new area of activity is often taken via suggestions and 
recommendations of government authorities rather than through an evaluation of market signals”. It 
is obvious that there is an important relationship between governments and businesses. Moreover, as 
Çolpan, Hikino and Lincoln’s book (the Oxford Handbook of Business Groups, 2010) shows, it is important 
to emphasize that this is not only a case for Turkey but almost for all countries, particularly for 
developing ones because governments need some specific groups to help them for the growth and 
sustain it (e.g. Buğra, 1994; Çolpan et al, 2010; Çolpan and Hikino, 2008; Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi 
and White, 2005; Khanna and Palebu, 2000; Tezel, 1982). Big business groups have undertaken the task 
of basic developmental actors of modern economic development in successful developing countries 
(Buğra, 1994; Çolpan et al, 2010; Çolpan and Hikino, 2008). In other words, there are mutual needs 
between them. In this context, despite the nuances, the holding companies or family holdings in Turkey 
is assumed under the same conceptual framework with the groups of Spain and South America, business 
houses of India, chaebol of South Korea, keiretsu of Japan and qiye jituan of China (e.g. Buğra, 1994; 
Çolpan and Hikino, 2008; Karaevli, 2008; Özkara et al., 2008).  
The relationship between some giant business groups and governments is an important claim 
which is often expressed as a necessity to grow and make the achieved growth sustainable (e.g. Buğra, 
1994; Schneider, 2010; Tezel, 1982). One of the most important reasons behind the frequent discussion 
of this claim is the growing interest in diversified business groups, which are frequently seen in 
developing countries as serious economic actors against developed countries (e.g. Colpan, Hikino and 
Linkoln, 2010). With diversified business groups that is defined by Colpan and Jones (2016: 69) as “the 
term business group has been used broadly to encompass quite different organizational forms, 
including network-type, diversified and pyramidal groups, even if most research has focused on 
'diversified' business groups that are active in technologically unrelated businesses”, the studies on 
business groups and developing countries show that it is one of the most common growth options, 
although Nguyen and Cai, (2016) argue that diversification is a rare event. The diversification strategy, 
which is the most important growth method of these groups and the popularity of the diversification 
strategy has also constituted an important field of study (Colpan and Jones, 2016). In this context, while 
it is often claimed that the main motivations identified in the central countries are valid for the whole 
world, on the contrary, it is emphasized that cultural and national differences will also lead to 
differences in this field. This study also predicts that the main drivers will differ in different countries. 
For this reason, it is claimed that the adoption of the diversification strategy of business groups in 
Turkey, which has a different class from the central country in terms of the national business systems 
that Whitley presents, can be based on more political-based reasons than the main sources of 
motivation in the central literature. This study is tried to examine that, different motivations may be 
the subject of different political periods and even different groups may follow this strategy for various 
reasons due to different attitudes towards politics with the emphasis on the diversified business groups 
classification made by Schneider (2010). Therefore, the largest business groups in Turkey have been 
identified and six of them have been selected to examine the main sources of the motivation behind 
the adoption of the diversification strategy in different political periods. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that in recent years there has been an increasing number of 
significant contributions from European and Asian countries, but almost all literature and the main 
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theories still arise in North America, which is the central country. In this study, it is anticipated that 
the data obtained from Turkey, which is in a different business system (State-Organized Business 
Systems) from North America (Compartmentalized Business Systems), will be important in terms of 
further enriching the literature. 
 
2. The Growth of Business Groups 
The growth of the businesses is carried out in several ways and they show significant differences among 
small, medium and large enterprises. However, we can classify them into two main groups; internal 
(organic) growth and external (inorganic) growth. Whilst the important examples of organic growth are 
product-related strategies, geographic expansion and integration; inorganic growth is merger and 
acquisitions, licensing, franchising and strategic alliances. Another important classification is 
concentration versus diversification strategies that are the main strategies under the corporate level 
strategies. With the words of Hofer and Schendel (1978, p.27) "corporate-level strategy is concerned 
primarily with answering the question of what set of businesses should we be in. Consequently, scope 
and resource deployments among businesses are the primary components of corporate strategy". While 
concentration refers to focus on the core businesses of companies and become an expert at the core 
businesses via generic strategies such as differentiation, low-cost leadership and focus; diversification 
refers the new lines or markets of activities.  
Ramanujam and Varadarajan (1989: 525) define diversification as “the entry of a firm or business 
unit into new lines of activity, either by processes of internal business development or acquisition, which 
entail changes in its administrative structure, systems, and other management processes”.  It can be related 
or unrelated to the companies’ core activities and it is named as “related diversification” or “unrelated 
diversification” based on its relationship (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989; Rumelt, 1982). 
Diversification is done in two ways: The first one is to go to the diversification of products in the 
relevant market through forward integration, backward integration and horizontal integration. The 
second way is to go to the diversification of products in unrelated markets. This seen very risky for 
companies because they are new in a new market and they do not have sufficient information about it. 
However, Analoui and Karami, (2003) stated that this risk has been decreased over time.  
It has been suggested that there are three main motivations behind the diversification strategies 
of organizations: growth, risk aversion and benefit from economies of scope (Karaevli, 2008):  
 
Growth: When companies believe they have grown up to an advanced level in their main industry or 
market, they look for ways to invest in other areas.  
 
To Benefit from The Scope of Economies: Another theoretical background is the motivation of benefit 
from economies of scope based on the field of industrial organization and organizational economics. 
According to this, by producing different products together, organizations diversify their operations 
across different product / service areas with the aims to spread the costs of production, advertising, 
distribution and management to various products and take advantage of the skills of these issues and 
the customer loyalty (Buğra, 1994; Chang, 2003; Çolpan and Hikino; 2008; Karaevli, 2008; Purkayastha, 
Manolova and Edelman, 2012).  
 
Risk Avoidance: One of the benefits of the diversification strategy is, by operating in different areas, 
to spread the risk into different areas as possible and gain the flexibility to deploy resources from each 
other in independent business units (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Buğra, 1994; Çolpan and Hikino; 
2008; Karaevli, 2008; Purkayastha, Manolova and Edelman, 2012). 
Due to directly based on an economic background, the motivation of benefit from economies is 
the most acceptable reason behind diversification strategy (Chang, 2003; Karaevli, 2008). However, it 
is not easy to think that theories explaining the motivation of diversification of organizations in 
developed economies can explain the motivation and forms of diversification of business groups that 
emerged in developing countries which have different political, economic, legal and institutional 
conditions for the external environment (Wan, 2005). Since, as Karaevli (2008) also stated, these 
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theories cannot explain enough this high rate of diversification of family businesses that there is not a 
clear separation between ownership and management. If so, what are the main motivations of the 
largest Turkish business groups on diversification? The idea claiming that governments have a 
significant effect on the issue has become more spoken. Foreign trade and investment policies of the 
governments and incentives they offer in these areas have encouraged these business groups to invest 
in different sectors or export and caused to become a diversified company because these big groups 
want to seize opportunities (Chang and Choi, 1988; Guillen, 2000).  
Picone and Dagnino (2016) have classified the main motivation of (unrelated) diversification into 
three class as i) Environmental and Institutional, ii) Organizational Value-Enhancing and iii) 
Managerial drivers. As Environmental and Institutional Drivers, the authors have focused on the 
relationships between unrelated diversification with the institutional context and the institutional 
context and the relationship the strategic choices and the evolution of the macroeconomic and social 
system to produce the functions of the missing institutions. While, under the Organizational Value-
Enhancing Drivers, establishing an internal capital market (e.g. risk reduction, lower costs of financial 
transaction, proper management liquidity cash practices), achieving market power (e.g. predatory 
pricing strategy), leveraging valuable and imperfectly imitable resources, cross-fertilization and know-
how blending and capturing strategic flexibility are accepted as the main antecedents; Weberian power 
and prestige and Schumpeterian empire-building reasons, escalating the demand for managerial skills, 
generating favourable conditions for misleading the shareholders and risk reduction are the 
antecedents as managerial drivers.  
In addition these main motivations, there are some different perspectives which have enough 
voice in the last decades. First,  according to the assumptions of agency theory, growth is not based on 
any rational strategy of the organization but top managers’ desires. Senior executives give the growth 
decision to satisfy their personal egos or to earn a financial gain (Jensen, 1993; Karaevli, 2008). 
Interestingly, some researchers suppose that the big economic crisis of USA in 2008 revealed because 
of this reason (e.g. Reavis, 2009). Another different point of view is the government policy perspective. 
The high diversity of companies is a result of the state policies of the country and the diversity of these 
policies. Thus, the diversification may be more or less in line with the preferences of the state (Gökşen 
ve Üsdiken, 2001). Lastly, according to the power perspective, foreign trade and investment policies 
and government incentives offered in new areas have encouraged big business groups to invest in 
different sectors because they are stronger than others. As a result, large groups have become 
diversified as they seek to seize opportunities (Chang and Choi, 1988; Guillen, 2000). 
 
3. Classification of Business Groups 
Schneider (2010) classifies business groups into three different classes based on their characteristics.  
Table 1: Diversified Business Groups  
 Organic Portfolio 
Policy-
induced 
Core 
Motivations 
Economies of scope 
(and vertical 
integration) 
Risk 
management 
Government 
incentives 
Scope of 
diversification Narrower Broadest Broader 
Integration of 
management High Variable Variable 
Groups ties to 
subsidiary Longer term Shorter term Shorter term 
(Schneider, 2010; p. 654) 
Organic Groups: While the most important diversification type of organic groups developing to 
benefit from the scope of the economy is usually vertical integration, as companies expand their scope 
of the economy, they tend to invest more to Greenfields. For example, in the 55-year period between 
1938 and 1993, Samsung established 62 new companies and doubled the number of acquisition and it 
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seems that acquisitions were predominant in the first years and Greenfield in the last decades of this 
period. In addition, while the establishment of new companies is preferred to enter a new industry, 
acquisitions are usually used as horizontal integration (Kang 1997: 37 as cited in Schneider, 2010). 
 
Portfolio Groups: Portfolio groups that aim to reduce risk and maximize returns tend to diversify 
through acquisition rather than establishing a new firm from scratch, but tend to easily transfer firms 
they find problematic. Such groups are mostly bank-based groups and they more often invest in 
different sectors than main group companies. Moreover, the technological incentives for management 
integration are lower, and particularly in developed countries, owners of the group generally permit 
significant autonomy to the management of subsidiaries. Nevertheless, broad diversification has led to 
problems of asymmetry of information and agency that can encourage more management integration 
especially in less competitive markets and in developing countries. 
 
Policy-Induced Groups: Policy-based groups, which are based on government incentives or directives 
rather than rational decisions, are privileged groups that receive government support for a number of 
areas, from industrial incentives, privatizations, customs, tariffs and other protection. These groups, 
which can be classified as a subdivision of patrimonial groups, can be distinguished conceptually from 
other groups (organic and portfolio) based on stronger economic motivations. 
 
4. National Business Systems (NBS) 
The national business system approach developed by Richard Whitley speaks of six different national 
business systems that vary from country to country, by focusing on the relationship of the forms of 
doing business in different countries with the social context (Fıkırkoca, 2012). These six different 
business systems are shaped according to the eight basic dimensions shown in table 2. Moreover, in 
addition to eight key dimensions, Whitley focused on the following four institutions in order to make 
cross-country comparisons and to identify sets of business systems (Fıkırkoca, 2012): a) State, b) 
Financial system, c) Skill development and control system, d) Trust and authority relations 
 
Table 2: Business Systems and Characteristics 
 
Source: Whitley (1999, p. 42) 
 
Fragmented Business Systems: These business systems have high direct control and low ownership 
and alliance coordination. Collaboration between firms is limited and markets are highly competitive. 
These business systems are often found in environments where trust is low and financial resources are 
not easily accessible (Hotho, 2014). In such business systems, companies tend to grow less because it 
is only possible to grow with their own resources (Selekler Gökşen, 2007). It is seen in countries like 
China. 
 
Coordinated Industrial District Business Systems: In this kind of business systems where small firms 
dominate, alliance integration is more comprehensive and they are also more artisanal.  In these 
305 
Turkish Business System and Diversification 
 
 
systems where the resources and opportunities are easily changed by the companies, the companies 
are supported by the local institutions rather than the national institutions (Hotho, 2014; Selekler 
Gökşen, 2007). As seen in most of Italy's industrial regions, local government agencies help increase 
entry and exit barriers and provide a high-quality education system (Best, 1990; Whitley, 1994 as cited 
in Hotho, 2014). 
 
Compartmentalized: This business system, which promotes competition among firms that tend to be 
larger and organizationally integrated is usually seen in Anglo-Saxon countries. In these business 
systems, the risk is not shared with the institutions but thanks to the strong institutional structure they 
have, it does not hinder their growth (Hotho, 2014; Selekler Gökşen, 2007). 
 
State-Organized Business Systems: In such business systems, states take a more active role in 
economic development and risk-sharing, and therefore the relationship with the state is vital. These 
systems, where company owners are usually the most active people in company management, are seen 
in countries like Turkey and South Korea, and the relations with the state are managed by the owners 
themselves (Hotho, 2014; Selekler Gökşen, 2007). This encourages direct ownership with closer links 
between political and economic elites, and limits anti-ownership coordination (Hotho, 2014; Whitley, 
2000). Relations among firms are rather weak because the state allocates the resources directly by 
themselves and the companies are competing for this distribution (Hotho, 2014; Gökşen, 2007; 
Whitley, 2000). 
 
Collaborative and Highly Coordinated Business Systems: While centralization, professionalization 
and diversification of activities are moderate in these business systems observed in developed countries 
such as Germany and Japan where strong links and risk sharing between economic actors are found, the 
importance of intermediary institutions is great. While states encourage and facilitate business union 
among economic actors in collaborative business systems, they are playing a more active guide role in 
highly coordinated business systems (Hotho, 2014; Gökşen, 2007; Whitley, 2000). 
 
5. Data Processing and Discussion 
To be able to make comparisons, ten political periods were determined from 1923 to 2016. In these ten 
periods, there are two military administration, two coalition parties and six single party governments 
as seen in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Political periods between 1923 to 2016 
The Eras Start Finish 
1- Single-Party Era -1 30.11.1923 22.05.1950 
2- Democratic Party Era - 1 22.05.1950 27.05.1960 
3- 1st Military Coup Era - 3 27.05.1960 20.02.1965 
4- Justice Party Era - 1 20.02.1965 26.03.1971 
5- First Era of Coalitions - 2 26.03.1971 20.09.1980 
6- 2nd Military Coup Era - 3 20.09.1980 13.12.1983 
7- ANAP Era -1 13.12.1983 20.11.1991 
8- DYP Era - 1 20.11.1991 06.03.1996 
9- Second Era of Coalitions 
-2 06.03.1996 18.11.2002 
10- Ak Party Era - 1 18.11.2002 Ongoing 
Source: Premiership of Republic of Turkey, 2016 
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In addition to the periods, Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ISO) has explained Turkey's largest companies 
since 1968 and in this study, the owner families or groups of these companies have been first 
determined and state-owned enterprises and the companies that are not diversified have eliminated to 
determine the largest groups (ISO 500, 2015). Considering this information, the largest 30 groups of 
Turkey are seen at table 4.  
 
Table 4: The largest 30 business groups or families in Turkey (2015) 
Group ID Group Name 
Foundation 
Year Ownership Families 
1 ÇUKUROVA 1923 KARAMEHMET FAMILY 
2 İŞ BANKASI 1924 İŞ BANKASI FUND & CHP 
3 KOÇ 1926 KOÇ FAMILY 
4 SABANCI 1932 SABANCI FAMILY 
5 STFA 1938 TÜRKEŞ AND AKKAYA FAMILIES 
6 ECZACIBAŞI 1942 ECZACIBAŞI FAMILY 
7 BORUSAN 1944 KOCABIYIK FAMILY 
8 ÜLKER 1944 ÜLKER FAMILY 
9 YAŞAR 1945 YAŞAR FAMILY 
10 ANADOLU 1949 YAZICI AND ÖZILHAN FAMILY 
11 DOĞAN 1950 DOĞAN FAMILY 
12 KAZANCI* 1950 KAZANCI FAMILY 
13 DOĞUŞ 1951 ŞAHENK FAMILY 
14 AKKÖK* 1952 DINÇKÖK FAMILY 
15 ZORLU 1953 ZORLU FAMILY 
16 ALARKO 1954 ALATON AND GARIH FAMILY 
17 TEKFEN 1956 
AKÇAĞLILAR, BERKER AND GÖKYIĞIT 
FAMILIES 
18 BOYDAK 1957 BOYDAK FAMILY 
19 ENKA 1957 TARA AND GÜLÇELIKFAMILIES 
20 KALE 1957 BODUR FAMILY 
21 ÇELEBİ 1958 ÇELEBIOĞLU FAMILY 
22 GÜRİŞ 1958 YAMANTÜRK FAMILY 
23 OYAK 1961 ARMED FORCES PENSION FUND 
24 SANKO 1966 KONUKOĞLU FAMILY 
25 NERGİS 1967 ÇAĞLAR AND ŞANKAYA FAMILIES 
26 KİBAR 1972 KIBAR FAMILY 
27 CİNER 1978 CINER FAMILY 
28 ŞAHİNLER 1982 ŞAHIN FAMILY 
29 FİBA 1987 ÖZYEĞIN FAMILY 
30 ÇALIK* 1930 ÇALIK FAMILY 
The diversification information of these groups was investigated and only six of them could be accessed 
which are Çukurova, Koç, Sabancı, Doğan, Doğuş and Zorlu. The necessary information was collected 
through activity reports, the official website of the groups, group magazine, news bulletins and books 
written by founders and managers of the groups (e.g. Bizden Haberler, 2013; Dündar, 2006; 2008; Kıraç, 
1995; Koç, 1972; 1987; Sabancı, 1985; 1993). When there is conflicting information, activity reports 
and official documents are considered as a basis. Now firstly the frequencies will be present and then 
all information will be discussed in depth.  
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Table 5: Number of Unrelated Diversification  
 
 Sabancı Koç Çukurova Doğan Doğuş Zorlu 
Era 1 3 6 2    
Era 2 1 6 1 1 1 1 
Era 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Era 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Era 5 2 1 5 2 2 0 
Era 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Era 7 2 0 1 0 2 0 
Era 8 3 4 1 0 1 2 
Era 9 2 2 2 4 2 3 
Era 
10 
0 1 
0 1 3 2 
 
Table 6: Number of Related Diversification 
 
 Sabancı Koç Çukurova Doğan Doğuş Zorlu 
Era 1 5 12 1    
Era 2 5 15 1 0 0 0 
Era 3 1 16 2 1 0 0 
Era 4 4 13 1 0 0 0 
Era 5 15 33 1 3 2 2 
Era 6 2 6 0 0 0 0 
Era 7 17 10 3 2 9 1 
Era 8 17 7 4 7 8 0 
Era 9 18 18 12 17 15 11 
Era 
10 27 12 8 30 80 20 
 
0
5
10
Sabancı Koç Çukurova
Doğan Doğuş Zorlu
 
 
5 5 1 4
15
2
17 17 18 2712 15 16 13
33
6 10 7 121 1 2 1 1 0 3 4
12 80 0 3 2
7
30
0 2 9 8
5
80
1 0 1
20
0
50
100
Sabancı Koç Çukurova
Doğan Doğuş Zorlu
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As is seen above, while the huge differences between periods can be observed in terms of unrelated 
diversification (Table 5), there are more stable changes for the related diversification (Table 6). On the 
other hand, considering the total number of industries and companies, it would not be wrong to claim 
that all companies have a sustainable growth almost in all periods although sharp zigzags were seen in 
some periods (Table 7 & 8). 
The background information given in tables 5 to 8 show that there are some very interesting issues: 
for instance, Era 5 is a complete breakpoint due to the growth activities experienced in terms of all 
firms and diversification strategies. In this period, about 9 and a half years, exactly 11 governments 
were established and there are absolute unstable economic and political conditions. As it is claimed 
often at the main literature, in such conditions, the groups show the tendency to distribute the risk 
among firms and they try to gain flexibility through unrelated diversification (e.g. Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990; Buğra, 1994; Çolpan and Hikino; 2008; Çolpan et al, 2010: Karaevli, 2008; Purkayastha 
et al., 2012). However, considering the related diversification, similar high-level growths are also 
observed in terms of related diversification, which contradicts the main literature suggesting that firms 
will make more cautious growth operations and will never do because of the risk factor reaching 
maximum in these periods as it observed in Era 6 which is a military administration period.  
 
Table 7: Total number of industries/markets 
 
 Sabancı Koç Çukurova Doğan Doğuş Zorlu 
Era 1 4 7 2    
Era 2 5 13 3 1 1 1 
Era 3 5 5 3 2 1 1 
Era 4 8 8 3 2 1 1 
Era 5 10 11 8 4 3 1 
Era 6 10 11 8 4 3 1 
Era 7 12 13 9 4 5 1 
Era 8 15 13 10 4 6 3 
Era 9 14 15 12 8 8 6 
Era 
10 13 16 12 9 11 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
Sabancı Koç Çukurova
Doğan Doğuş Zorlu
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Table 8: Total number of companies 
 
 Sabancı Koç Çukurova Doğan Doğuş Zorlu 
Era 1 7 17 3    
Era 2 13 37 5 1 1 1 
Era 3 14 52 7 3 1 1 
Era 4 21 64 8 3 1 1 
Era 5 38 96 14 8 5 3 
Era 6 40 101 14 8 5 3 
Era 7 59 110 18 10 16 4 
Era 8 74 121 23 17 25 6 
Era 9 79 137 37 38 42 20 
Era 
10 
95 148 45 39 125 42 
When the other coalitions and military administrated periods are considered, very similar comments 
can be made for all observed groups. Thus, it is easy to claim that coalition periods not a big problem 
for largest groups but military administrated periods are a very problematic. For example, considering 
the unrelated diversification, there is only one observation for all of six groups during the all military 
periods while there are 29 observations during the coalition governments. Similar observations are seen 
in terms of related diversification: while there are 137 activities observed in the coalition governments 
period, only 28 activities could be realized in military periods. When the total industry numbers are 
examined, only one growth activity was observed for Doğan groups in the first Military Coup Era, while 
Koç group which is the biggest group of the period reduces its total industry number from 13 to 5. In 
the second Military Coup Era, there are not any observations. The numbers can be useful but they may 
not be sufficiently descriptive and hence the percentages and annual averages based on period type will 
be now examined.  
Table 9: Activity Increase Based on Period Type 
 Sabancı Koç Çukurova Doğan Doğuş Zorlu Average 
Single Parties 70 80 23 11 104 26 52,33 
Coalitions 22 48 20 26 21 16 25,50 
Military 3 20 2 2 0 0 4,50 
 
Table 10: Average Annual Activity Increase Based on Period Type 
 Sabancı Koç Çukurova Doğan Doğuş Zorlu Average 
Single Party 1,09 1,25 0,36 0,30 2,81 0,70 1,09 
Coalitions 1,47 3,20 1,33 1,73 1,40 1,07 1,70 
Military 0,38 2,50 0,25 0,25 0,00 0,00 0,56 
 
Table 11: Growth Rates (Percentage) by Period Type 
 Sabancı Koç Çukurova Doğan Doğuş Zorlu Average 
Single Party 0,46 0,34 0,32 0,24 1,18 0,48 0,53 
Coalitions 0,44 0,32 0,68 1,45 2,34 2,17 1,23 
Military 0,06 0,23 0,20 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,25 
0
100
200
Sabancı Koç Çukurova
Doğan Doğuş Zorlu
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When only the number of activities are taken into account (Table 9), it is easy to claim that single party 
governments are the best times to growth, while it is doubled the coalitions periods, there are 11 times 
more growth activities than military periods. However, considering in annual based, there is a very 
interesting result that coalitions periods are the period of most growth activity. In these periods, the 
average of annual growth was 1,70 while it is 1.09 in single party eras and 0,56 in military 
administration.  
The percentages at table 11 represent the average growth rate of each period compared to the 
previous period. Both coalition governments came into force after a single party government and after 
each military administration, a single party government came into force but more growth activities 
have seen in the coalition eras. When the total number of affiliated companies is taken into 
consideration, the periods in which the Koç and Sabancı groups have the greatest growth periods are 
single party eras while the coalition periods are the most prosperous growth periods of Çukurova, 
Doğan, Doğuş and Zorlu groups.This data is not, of course, capable to claim any bold arguments only 
by itself however it is obvious that there is an important relationship between period type and growth 
activities.  
Lastly, if the Whitley and Schneider’s classifications are focused, Turkey is accepted as a member 
of policy-induced diversified groups of Schneider and state-organized business systems of Whitley. 
Both classifications emphasize that there is an important relationship between state and groups and 
having a good relationship with the state have seen crucial due to the state’s active role in economy, 
risk-sharing and resource allocation. In this study, the opposite of these allegations was not reached as 
well. For example, when the era 10 is focused, while, the Doğuş and Zorlu groups, which had better 
relations with the ruling party of the period, grew by 197.6% and 110% compared to the previous period, 
Doğan group, which has respectively bad relations with the state recorded a growth of only 2,63% in 
the same period. However, it important to highlight that when each group is individually focused, there 
are some different data. For instance, Koç and Sabancı which are accepted relatively larger, well-
established and more institutionalized groups seem to have made more economically rational decisions 
with the sale of their major companies from time to time. These behaviors called as corporate 
refocusing (Hoskisson et al., 2005) or Multi-Focusing Diversification (Karevli, 2008) in literature 
correspond to invest in other high added value areas as in the case of Koç's selling Migros and focusing 
the Yapı Kredi and Tüpraş. However, this kind of behaviors is not seen for other groups. On the other 
hand, Schneider (2010) emphasizes that any of these three groups can gain weight in some countries 
or periods but in practice, these three groups can be observed in each country and period. For example, 
the core set of organic subsidiaries could be blended other strategies by combining with another set of 
risk-balancing portfolio investments. In other cases, organic or portfolio groups can be stimulated by 
specific policies to enter new sectors, especially during periods of rapid political change. This also 
shows that the mix of diversified groups’ characteristics may be valid for different groups in the same 
country.  
 
6. Conclusion 
It has found a voice that business groups are emerging in different forms depending on the different 
politico-economic environment and business groups also can vary with changes in these conditions. 
Thus, this study is also built on the idea that the effect of different economic and political conditions 
may show differences in various business groups. Moreover, we think it will show differences even in 
diversification and the type of diversification, and the relationships with the government in question 
period have a significant impact on the decisions of business groups. Therefore, this study set out to 
determine the relationship between various political eras and the growth and diversification decision 
of the largest business groups.  
It has been determined that different political periods have a significant effect on large groups and 
when the periods are examined one by one, differences are observed in terms of related and unrelated 
diversification in different government periods: When the effects of growth, diversification and the 
type of diversification in each period are analyzed independently and comparatively, the Sabancı and 
Koç groups achieved the highest growth figures during the single-party periods (Single Party Period, 
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Democratic Party, Justice Party, Anavatan Party, Doğru Yol Party and AK Party) while the other four 
groups achieved more growth activity during the coalition-party periods. In the military periods, all the 
groups except Doğan experienced the weakest times. The era 5, the coalition era, was the period when 
almost all groups peaked in terms of unrelated diversity. It is clear that the best period is clearly ANAP 
(Era 7) and the worst is the 2nd military coup (Era 6). The existence of so many growth activities in the 
seventh period generally overlaps with the liberal economic programs adopted by the Ozal government. 
Moreover, the good relations with Turgut Ozal, who is the ruling power of the era and the former 
manager of the group, have a significant influence on Sabancı Group's remarkable growth in this period. 
Finally, it can be clearly seen that there is a general increase in sector diversity and total activity number 
although increases or decreases are observed between periods in the numbers or types of 
diversification. 
The study explains the central importance of main growth motivation and pattern in Turkey 
context and hence it is expected that findings will show significant contributions to the literature. The 
evidence from this study may suggest completely different and novel point of views. The research 
results accessed by this study may help business group managers to understand better the new 
environmental and competitive conditions in the process of integration with the global competition. 
Also, it may be a guide to decide the new strategies and the necessities of these strategies under these 
new environmental conditions. Of course, it should not be ignored that this is a proposal work and 
some changes may be experienced during the process but being a proposal is the main limitations of 
the study with the time. 
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